Denver Law Review
Volume 23

Issue 9

Article 8

1946

Vol. 23, no. 9: Full Issue
Dicta Editorial Board

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
23 Dicta (1946).

This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

f
VOLUME

23

1946

f

The Denver Bar Association
The Colorado Bar Association
1946

Printed in U. S. A.

THE BRADFORD-ROBINSON PRINTING CO.
Denver, Colorado

VOL. XXIII

SEPTEMBER, 1946

No. 9

Calendar
October 7. Denver Bar Association, first fall meeting.
October 18 and 19. Colorado Bar Association annual meeting, Broadmoor
Hotel, Colorado Springs. Hon. Tom Clark, Attorney General of the
United States, principal speaker.
October 28 to November 1. American Bar Association, annual meeting, Atlantic City, New Jersey.

Colorado Bar Association Will Meet
Tom C. Clark, Attorney General of the United States, will be the
banquet speaker at the annual convention of the Colorado Bar Association
to be held in Colorado Springs at the Broadmoor Hotel on October 18 and
19, as announced by President Frank Moorhead. According to the tentative
plans of the convention committee the theme of the 1946 convention will be
Improvement of the Judicial System.
The convention will open Friday morning with a meeting of the Board
of Governors, of the Water Law section, a business meeting of the Junior
Bar section, and a joint meeting of the Probate and Trust Law section and
the County Judges' Association. The Friday luncheon entertainment will be
provided by the Law Club of Denver. The afternoon session will be under
the supervision of the Junior Bar Section. Their program will feature matters of general interest to the entire bar with emphasis on the problems of
the returning lawyer. The El Paso County Bar Association is arranging for
entertainment on Friday evening.
On Saturday morning Philip S. Van Cise, chairman of the Committee
on Judicial Administration, will lead the discussion on the reformation of
the court system in Colorado. Since this meeting is of vital importance it
is hoped that as many lawyers as possible will make arrangements to attend.
On Saturday afternoon President Frank Moorhead will deliver the annual
president's address and the remainder of the afternoon will be devoted to a
discussion of title work and the business of the state association.
The address by Attorney General Clark will mark the end of the convention.
Mr. Clark was born in Dallas, Texas, on September 23, 1899. He was
educated in the public schools of Dallas, at the Virginia Military Institute,
191

DICTA

and the University of Texas, where he received an A.B. degree in 1921 and
an LL.B. degree in 1922.
Admitted to the bar in June 1922, he immediately entered into the
private practice of law in partnership with his father and brother. In 1927
he was selected Civil District Attorney for Dallas County, Texas, in which
position he served until 1932 when he was fiamed Master in Chancery in
the Joiner oil litigation cases affecting the title in East Texas oil fields.
Mr. Clark came to the Department of Justice in 1937. In September
1938, he was appointed special assistant to the Attorney General in the
Antitrust Division. He was active in the prosecution of a number of cases
growing out of the Agriculture Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 and
the Wage and Hour Law. In 1939 he acted as chief of the Wage and Hour
Unit of the Antitrust Division, and that fall he was placed in charge of the
Antitrust field office at New Orleans, Louisiana. Mr. Clark was named
Regional Director for the Antitrust Division, West Coast Field Offices, in
April of 1940. In January 1942, the Attorney General named Mr. Clark
as Coordinator of Alien Enemy Control in the Western Defense Command.
In May 1942, Mr. Clark was placed in charge of the War Frauds Unit of
the Department of Justice. In September he was given the additional post
of first assistant to Assistant Attorney General, Thurman Arnold, in charge
of the Antitrust Division. On March 29, 1943, Mr. Clark was appointed
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, succeeding
Mr. Thurman Arnold.

Committee Correction
EDWARD MILLER, 930 University Bldg., Denver, is a member of the committee on Real Estate Standards of the Denver Bar Association. His name
was inadvertently omitted from the committee list recently published in DIcTA.

Our Returning Lawyer-Veterans
MILTON J. BLAKE, col., Judge Advocate General's Dept., Army, served from
Mar. 1941 -to Aug. 1946. He was asst. staff judge advocate, Ft. Bliss, Texas,
from Mar. to June 1941. He then went to the Judge Advocate General's
Dept., Wash., and in March 1943 became Chief, Legal Assistance Branch,
Judge Advocate General's Office. He received the Legion of Merit, Army
Commendation Ribbon, and personal letters of commendation from the
Undersecretary of War and Secretary of the Navy. He was admitted to
the Colorado bar in 1928, and was in general practice in Denver from that
time until 1941. He has an LL.B. degree from Denver University Law
School, 1928. He is associated in practice with his father, Milton E. Blake,
522 Colorado Bldg., Denver, and is a candidate for the state legislature on
the Republican ticket.
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ORA H. GEORGE, major, Air Corps, served from April 1942 to March 1946
in the continental United States. He is now practicing law at 730 Equitable
Bldg., Denver.
Roy H. BLACKMAN, JR., capt., Judge Advocate General's Dept., served from
Sept. 1943 to Mar. 1946. He had his basic training in Camp Barkeley,
Texas, in medics, and was sent overseas (New Guinea) as a mathematician.
He was returned to 0. C. S. in Sept. 1944. He later served in the Financial
Litigation Branch, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Washington, D. C.
He is now counsel, Real Estate Disposal, War Assets Administration, 417
Boston Bldg., Denver.
M. WOOD, 1st It., Judge Advocate General's Dept., served from
Aug. 1942 to March 1946 in England, Frances, Belgium, Luxembourg and
the United States. He is practicing at 850 Equitable Bldg., Denver.
LAWRENCE

K. Ris, 1st It., Judge Advocate General's Dept., served from May
1943 to July 1946. After basic training he went to replacement depot in
Australia, and was then sent to New Guinea for over a year with the 32nd
Infantry Division. He was returned to the Judge Advocate General's School,
and after graduation remained on the staff to teach Military Justice until
the close of the school. He then went to Omaha as Chief, Military Justice
Section, SJA Office, Headquarters Seventh Service Command. Before entering the service he was associated with Lowell White for four years. He has
now opened his own office at 304 Denver National Bldg., Denver, Cherry
7164.
WILLIAM

Admitted to a Higher Court
E. MUNSON died recently at the age of 74. For the past 25 years
he had been Judge of the District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District.
Judge Munson came to Sterling, Colorado, from Nebraska in 1896. He
taught school for a few years and was admitted to the bar in 1902, after
which he was associated in the practice with his brother T. E. Munson. In
1921 he was appointed District Judge when the number of Judges in the
Thirteenth Judicial District was increased from one to two, and had held
the office since.
HARRY

Announcement Regarding Binding of
Supreme Court Records
DICTA is informed by the Clerk of the Supreme Court that the binderies
have increased their price for binding records for the court. Plaintiffs in
error who wish the clerk to attend to the binding of their records will need
to deposit the sum of $1.35 a volume, beginning September 1.
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Colorado Bar Association
Treasurer's Report
Treasurer
FISCAL YEAR JULY 1, 1945 . JUNE 30, 1946
VERNON

On

Hand,

V.

KETRING,

June 30, 1945 ....................................................................

$3,345.85

RECEIPTS:
D ues .......................................................................................... $4,215.26
Sustaining M emberships .........................................................
125.00
Refund from State of Colorado ..............................................
194.40
Refund on Binders ...............
.....................
34.75
M iscellaneous ............................................................................
7.00

4,576.41

$7,922.26
DISBURSEMENTS:
Printing
............................................ $1,584.53
M ailing Dicta ..........................................................................
112.29
Secretary .................................................................
450.00
Telephone, Stamps, etc .............................................................
139.80
Stenographer ............................................................................
395.00
Paid out on behalf of State of Colo .......................................
194.40
Board of Governors' M eeting ....................................................
34.37
M iscellaneous ............................................................................
63.89
6tationery ..................................................................................
59.67
Junior Bar Section ....................................................................
50.00
Legal Institute (R.R. fares) ....................................................
144.90
Public Ledger ............................................................................
500.00
Bar Convention ........................................................................
593.15
Law W eek ................................................................
75.00
4,397.00
Purchase $2000 U.S. Treasury Bond ............................................................ 2,000.00
ON H AND, JUN E 30, 1946 ..............................................................................
$1,525.26
T otal

............................................................................................................

$7,922.26

Personals
P. HAYS has removed to Pueblo and is now practicing law at 420
Colorado Bldg. in that city.
HENRY

E. STONE, WILLIAM L. RICE and FRANCIS S. MANCINI have formed a
partnership for the general practice of law with offices at 821 E. & C. Bldg.,
Denver, under the firm name of Stone, Rice and Mancini.

JOEL

KARL C. BRAUNS, GRANT E. McGEE, RICHARD G. LUXFORD and THOMAS
M. TIERNEY have all opened new offices at 1513 Tremont Place, Denver,

suite 200, phone TAbor 7235.
A. MYERS has been appointed as chief deputy district attorney by
Denver district attorney James' T. Burke. He succeeds William L. Rice, -who
resigned to enter private practice. He has been in the district attorney's
office since 1942.
JOSEPH
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GLENN DONALDSON, formerly charman of the ninth regional wage
stabilization board in Denver, recently resigned to enter private practice
of law. During the war he served as chairman of the war labor board for
the same region and was chairman of the nonferrous metals commission for
eleven western states. He was formerly assistant attorney general of Colorado and also inheritance tax commissioner. He is now Democratic candidate for regent of the state university.
RAYMOND L. SAUTER, Sterling, has been appointed district judge of the thirteenth judicial district to succeed Judge H. E. Munson, who died recently.
Judge Sauter practised law for a number of years in Sterling, and has been
active in political circles.

Letter to the Editor
Editor:
In case your attention
interested in knowing that
York City Bar Association
ment by the state legislature

has not been called to this matter, you may be
the Law Enforcement Committee of the New
has approved a resolution to recommend enactof the following law:

"No officer, agent or employee of any department, commission, board, bureau or other agency of the state or any political
subdivision thereof, or of any public authority, public benefit corporation, or other public corporation, or district in the state, shall
counsel or advise any person, firm or corporation not to seek the
services of an attorney-at-law, or shall indicate to any person, firm
or corporation that the retainer of an attorney-at-law will be detrimental to such person, firm or corporation, in or in connection
with, any matter or transaction now or hereafter. pending before
him or them.
"Violation of this section shall be cause for reprimand, suspension, removal or discharge in the discretion of the authority
vested with the power to discipline such officer, agent or employee."
The committee in taking this action stated that it is a fundamental right
under the American system of government for a party to be represented by
counsel freely chosen and that this right is as essential in matters before
administrative boards as it is in courts, and that therefore it is improper for
any representative of any state agency to endeavor to persuade any party
appearing before such board from being represented by counsel freely
selected by the party intersted.
Very truly yours,

A. L. VOOL.
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Claims By and Against the Government Resulting
from War Department Activity t
By

CLIFFORD

L.

ASHTON*

Experience in claims offices of the Judge Advocate General's Department,
of the United States Army, has convinced the writer that many lawyers do
not have a full appreciation of the existing rights and remedies which are
provided for the relief of those who have been damaged by government
activity, particularly activity of military and civilian personnel of the War
Department. Several cases have come to the writer's attention of individuals
who have been advised by counsel that they had no legal remedy against the
government for damage and injuries sustained because of the general rule
of sovereign immunity from suit. While this is true, it does not follow that
an injured party cannot make claim against the government, nor that such
claims cannot be paid. Congress has made many inroads into the doctrine of
sovereign immunity by providing claims statutes authorizing various departments of the government to settle certain claims.' This legislation has probthe acts of government agents.
The purpose of this article is as follows: First, to outline briefly the
remedy and procedure provided by the Act of 3 July 1943, as amended by
2
the Act of 29 May 1945, commonly referred to as the Domestic Claims Act.

Second, to consider briefly the legislative relief available to damaged claimants through special relief bills presented at each session of the Congress.
Third, to review the policy and legal procedure involved in processing and
prosecuting claims which the government has against those whose negligent
acts have caused damage to government property and personnel.
I. Domestic Claims Act

The Act of 3 July 1943, as amended, commonly referred to as the
tReprinted by permission from the Utah Bar Bulletin, Jan.-Feb., 1946.
*Judge, City Court, Salt Lake City.
Various bills making the Federal government generally responsible for the negligence of its officers or employees have been introduced in Congress since 1925. Separate
bills passed both houses as early as the 69th Congress. The Federal Torts Bill, sponsored
by the American Bar Association and indorsed in principle by President Roosevelt in
his message to the 77th Congress passed the Senate but was not acted upon by the
House. The bill was reintroduced in the 78th Congress but did not pass. It is apparent
that the trend is away from sovereign immunity, and that in the near future the government will accept full responsibility for the torts of its officers and employees.

ably been enacted to relieve the Congress of the burden of a great number
of special relief bills which have been requested by individuals damaged by
2 57 Stat. 372; 31 U.S.C. 223b as amended by Public Law 67-79th Cong.; sec.
III, War Department Bulletin 9, 1945.
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Domestic Claims Act, confers authority on the War Department 3 to process
of the War Department acting within the scope of their employment. 4 Liability is limited to $1,000.00 in time of war and $500.00 in time of peace,
and extends to damage to, or loss or destruction of both real and personal
property., Q Liability for personal injury is restricted to reasonable medical,
hospital, and burial expense actually incurred. It does not include liability
for physical pain and suffering and loss of earning capacity recoverable in
ordinary tort actions.
Under the provisions of the act, claims for damage to or loss or destruction of property, or for personal injury or death, proximately caused by willful, negligent, wrongful, or otherwise tortious acts or omissions of military
personnel or civilian employees acting within the scope of their employment
are payable. Acts or omissions involving a lack of reasonable care are the
usual basis of claims so payable. However, the claimant must not be at fault
himself. If his negligent or wrongful act in any way proximately contributed
to his injury or damage his claim will be denied.
Claims for damage to or loss or destruction of property, or for personal
injury or death, though not caused by acts or omissions of military personnel
or civilian employees of the War Department or of the army, are payable
under the provisions of the Act of 3 July 1943, as amended, if otherwise
incident to the non-combat activities of the War Department or of the army.
In general, the claims within the above category are those arising out of
authorized activities which are peculiarly army activities having little parallel
' The War Department has implemented the Act of 3 July 1943 and 29 May 1945,
supra, by Army Regulation 25-25, dated 3 July 1943 and 29 May 1945 and Army
Regulations 25-20, dated 3 July 1943 and 29 May. Copies of these Army Regulations
may be obtained by writing to the Office of the Adjutant General in Washington.

and pay for certain damages caused by military personnel or civilian empolyees
4Although officers and enlisted men are not strictly speaking, servants or employees of the government, they are so considered for the purpose of determining liability under the Domestic Claims Act.
"The exact hour which has been fixed upon for the outbreak of the war with Japan
is 1:25 p.m., E.S.T., 7 Dec. 1941, Sec. III, Cir. 118, W.D., 23 April 1942. The Judge
Advocate General has frequently held that a state of war continues until a formal peace
treaty has been signed. Therefore, until such a peace treaty has been signed, the jurisdictional limit recoverable under the Domestic Claims Act is $1,000.00.
'While the Secretary of War does not have authority to settle claims over
$1,000.00 the act does authorize him to report to Congress claims over the applicable
limit. The Army Regulation which implements the act provides that such claims will
be forwalded to the Judge General for appropriate action. The Judge Advocate General,-if he considers the claim meritorious prepares a recommendation for the signature
of the Undersecretary of War which is transmitted to the Bureau and thence to the
Claims Committee of Congress. If Congress approves, which it usually does, the claim
is included in the next annual or deficiency appropriation act. It is important to note
that a claim made through the War Department, even though over the jurisdictional
amount, will not include elements to conpensate for loss of wages, pain and suffering,
permanent disability and death. (Army Regulation 25-25, 29 May 1945.) This limitation imposed by the Army Regulation does not apply to special relief bills, hereinafter
considered, which are requested by direct means through the Congress.
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in civilian pursuits and to situations which historically have been considered
as furnishing a proper basis for the payment of claims. For example, included
are claims for damage or injury arising out of, and which are natural or
probable results or incidents of, maneuvers and special field exercises, practice
firing of heavy guns, practice bombing, opjeration of aircraft and antiaircraft,
use of barrage balloons, escape of horses, use of instrumentalities having
latent mechanical defects not traceable to negligent acts or omissions, movement of combat vehicles or other vehicles designed especially for military
use, and use and occupancy of real estate. Negligence or wrongful act of
the claimant, in whole or in part the proximate cause, bars a claim.
The War Department rule which denies recovery to a claimant whose
negligence contributes to his injury or damage is so firmly established that
the Judge Advocate General has refused to accept any of the rules applied
in some jurisdictions which relax the established policy. Thus the doctrines
of comparative negligence and last clear chance are not applied under the
Domestic Claims Act.
Frequently a conflict of law question will arise. By analogy to the reasoning applied in Erie Railroad vs. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, the Judge Advocate
General has held that, in the absence of Federal law, the law of the situs
controls. Thus the "family purpose doctrine" will be applied if the claim
arose in a jurisdiction which follows that rule. So also, if the jurisdiction
imputes the negligence of one driving to the owner, irrespective of a master
servant relationship, the rule will be applied in passing on the contributory
negligence of the claimant.
Claims for damage to or loss or destruction of property must be presented by the owner of the property or his duly authorized agent or legal
representative. The word Towner", as so used, includes bailees, lessees, mortgagors and conditional vendees, but does not include mortgagees, conditional
vendors and others, having title for purposes of security only. Claims for
personal injury or death must be presented by the injured person or his duly
authorized agent or legal representative. Claims for medical, hospital and
burial expenses, not presented by the injured person, may, if it appears that
no legal representative has been appointed, be presented by any person who,
by reason of family relationship, has in fact incurred the expenses for which
claim is made.
Under the 1943 act military personnel and employees of the War Department could not tecover if their injury or damage occurred incident to their
service. Thus, if a soldier's automobile were damaged by a government vehicle
he could not, under the old act, recover from the government unless he could
show that he was engaged in a private matter, not incident to his service in
the army. This limitation has been removed by the present act so that now
army and War Department personnel have the same rights as other claimants.
The act provides that claims must be presented in writing within one
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year from the date of their accrual. However, if the incident giving rise to
the claim occurs in time of 'war, or if war intervenes within one year, the
claim, on good cause shown, may be presented until one year after peace is
established. The burden is on claimant to show good cause why his claim
was not presented within the year. Proof must be substantial, such as absence
from the country or military service, or an honest and reasonable belief that
all steps necessary have been taken.
Motor vehicle accidents are the greatest single source of claims under
the Domestic Claims Act. Frequently the owner of the property involved
in such an accident has a contract of insurance which provides subrogation
rights to the insurance company. The question that therefore arises is: What
are the rights of a subrogee insurance company under the Domestic Claims
Act? The right of subrogation was never recognized in connection with army
claims until 1932 when the Attorney General held that the right should be
recognized with respect to claims under the old negligence act.7 But under
the present act, here considered, a subrogee has no rights in that capacity
because the act specifically provides that only the insured or his agent will be
recognized by the government. The purpose of this provision is to prevent
splitting of claims with attendant administrative difficulties and possibility
of duplicate payment. The full amount, therefore, is paid to the insured or
his agent, regardless of whether a portion of the recovered sum may be recovered from the insured by his insurance company. The practical effect of this
rule is that the insurance companies make claim for the insured in insured's
name, as his agent, provided such agency is established.by a written power
of attorney or other writing evidencing an agency. This practice is common
and the War Department has no rule or policy which opposes its continuance.
Lawyers who advise and represent clients who have claims against the
government are, of course, interested in the procedure employed and the
policy which guides the administrative handling of such matters. The procedure is as follows:
When an accident .or incident occurs which results in damage to private
property, regardless of amount, or death or personal injury to a civilian,
except those covered by provisions of the United States Employees Compensation Act, an investigation is made. Every post, camp, or station has a claims
officer who has the responsibility of making these investigations. The primary
purpose is to develop information necessary to determine whether or not a
claim will be allowed by the government, or to determine whether or not a
claim exists in favor of the government. This information, which includes
required diagrams and exhibits, is compiled into a report. During the investigation the officer will ordinarily advise the damaged party of his right to
file a claim and will furnish the necessary forms and information required.
This will be done even though the officer may feel that the claimant is not
' 36 Atty. General 553.
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entitled to recover. The claims officer will forward his report, together with
his recommendation and claimant's claim, if one has been filed, to the commanding officer who appointed him. This commanding officer either approves
or disapproves the recommendation. If he does not have delegated authority
to settle the claim, which is the usual case, he forwards the original and one
copy of the report and claim to the commanding general of the service com*mand or the commanding officer of the air service command, depending on
which branch of the service is involved. At this point the evidence and recommendations are again reviewed by trained army officers in the commanding
general's judge advocate office. They write a review in which an approval
or disapproval is recommended. The review is placed on the commanding
general's desk for his action. His action will usually follow the recommendation of his claims judge advocate.
If he orders approval and payment, the claim is sent to the appropriate
disbursing officer for payment. If he disapproves the claim, in whole or in
part, the claimant is notified in writing of his right to appeal within 30 days
to the Secretary of War. If an appeal is filed within 30 days it is forwarded,
together with the complete record, to the Office of The Judge Advocate General in Washington. There the appeal is transferred to the claims division
where a recommendation is made. From there the file is sent to the Secretary
of War for his final action. His action will generally follow the recommendation of the Judge Advocate General. After action on the appeal by the
Secretary of War the claimant is notified. If the claim is finally approved
in less than the full amount, consent of the claimant to accept the lesser amount
approved must be obtained.
If no claim is filed with the investigating officer he forwards the original
and one copy of his report, through the channels herein indicated, to the office
of the claims judge advocate of the service command, or air service command,
where it is kept on record pending the filing of a claim.
The policy developed by the War Department in the payment of claims
under this act is an extremely liberal one. It is demonstrated in the opinions
of The Attorney General, The Comptroller General, The Judge Advocate
General, and other policy forming officials. It is also demonstrated in army
regulations and in general procedural and administrative War Department
practice.
Lawyers, accustomed to ordinary rules of causation and negligence, may
find the government's willingness to pay claims by liberal causation interpretation and without primary negligence somewhat startling. They will also
find that the ordinary "arms length" attitude developed by litigants in the
usual tort case does not exist between the government and a claimant; in fact
the claims officer is often so anxious to assist a damaged party in obtaining
every benefit provided in the act that his conduct is more apt to resemble that
of claimant's advocate than that of a government investigator. One reason
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like other public officials, sometimes feel toward the public treasury.
II. Legislative Relief
As herein indicated, one of the principle reasons for the enactment of
claims statutes is to relieve the Congress of the burden placed on it by special
bills for relief submitted by congressmen in behalf of constituents who have
suffered damage by reason of government activity. But this means of redress
is not removed by the enactment of claims statutes. It is a very effectual
remedy that still exists, and one that is frequently overlooked.
In considering this remedy it is important to distinguish it from the remedy provided in the Domestic Claims Act itself, particularly the provision
which enables the Secretary of War, acting through the Judge Advocate
General, to report to Congress for approval claims filed under the act which
are over $1,000.00. (See note 6.) Such claims, while not restricted in amount
are restricted as to the nature of the damage which may be recovered. Thus,
under a claim so filed damages occasioned by pain and suffering, loss of wages,
and permanent disability or death, are not allowable and will not be presented
to Congress by the War Department. This is because of the restriction in
the army regulation which implements the statute and which also provides a
legislative remedy.
If a claim is presented directly to Congress by means of a special relief
bill initiated by claimant's senator or representative none of the restrictions
contained in the army regulation apply. Damages payable by this method
are unlimited in nature and amount.
Suppose two hypothetical situations: First, a claimant's $2,000.00 automobile has been demolished in a collision with an army vehicle without any
fault on the part of claimant. Second, same facts, except that not only has
his automobile been damaged, he has been severely and permanently injured.
What is his remedy in each instance?
In the first case claimant has an adequate remedy provided by the Domestic Claims Act as implemented by Army Regulations 25-25. His claim is
entirely for property damage. Even though the amount is in excess of that
which the War Department may pay, The Judge Advocate General is authorized to prepare a recommendation for the signature of the Undersecretary
of War which will eventually be approved by the Claims Committee of
Congress. By this method claimant will receive the full amount of his damage
in the next deficiency appropriation act.
In the second case claimant can recover no more than $2,000.00 from
Congress if he initiates his claim with the War Department. Clearly this will
not compensate him for the injury he has sustained by reason of pain and
suffering, loss of wages, and permanent injury. Therefore claimant must look

202
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elsewhere for a remedy. He can obtain adequate relief by proceeding as
follows:
A letter is written to claimant's representative or senator requesting that
a special relief bill be submitted to Congress. There is no limit to the amount
which may be requested and no restriction on the nature of the damages which
may be recovered. After the bill has been submitted it is referred to the
Claims Committee of the Congress This committee refers it to the government agency which allegedly caused the injury or damage. If the damage
resulted from War Department activity it will be referred through the War
Department to The Judge Advocate General's Office in Washington. From
there it will be forwarded to the claims officer located in the area which the
alleged accident or incident occurred. The claims officer will make the usual
investigation and report, which report together with his recommendation, will
be forwarded to the service command headquarters where it will be reviewed
by the service command claims judge advocate. If necessary, additional investigation will be made.
After the completed file is returned to The Judge Advocate General's
Office in Washington the claims division of that office will review the evidence
and recommendations and request any further information which may be
required. Finally the reviewing officer will recommend that the claim be
approved in whole or in part, or that it be denied. This recommendation,
together with the review, will be sent to the Claims Committee where, for
all practical purposes, final action will be taken. In almost every case the
recommendation of The Judge Advocate General's Office is approved. As
a practical matter, therefore, it is important to understand the rules and
policy which guide that office in determining government liability.
Officers in The Judge Advocate Department are lawyers. Most of them
are well trained. Many have had considerable practical legal experience. It
is these men who review the evidence and apply the law upon which the claim
is determined. The law which they apply, under the reasoning of the Supreme
Court in Erie Railroad vs. Tompkins, supra, is the law of the situs. This law,
as every lawyer knows, consists of the ordinary rules evolved 'by the local
courts and established by statutes and ordinances in effect in the jurisdiction.
For this reason it is quite possible to advise a client who is seeking relief by
means of a special relief bill that his claim will be determined by the same
legal rules which would be applied by the local courts. The principle difference is that the method -employed is legislative rather than judicial.
It will be noted that the limitation imposed in the Domestic Claims Act,
specifically that which restricts damages in personal injury cases to actual
medical, hospital, and burial expense, does not apply under the legislative
remedy just considered.
It is important to point out that if a claimant has an adequate remedy
under the Domestic Claims Act, legislative relief by means of a special relief
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bill will be denied. The remedy will be considered adequate if the amount
claimed is less than the maximum sum payable under the Act.

M.

Claims by the Government

The government in exercising its inherent right to recover for damages
to government property in the custody or control of the War Department
or of the army, or for loss incurred by reason of the torts of third persons
proceeds in accordance with Army Regulation 25-220, 29 May 1945.8 This
regulation provides the procedure and scope for War Department claims.
Included within the provisions of the regulation are claims in excess of
$25.00, and claims in lesser amount when the assertion thereof is deemed in
the interest of the government. Included are the following: Damage to or
loss or destruction of government property; amount of pay and -allowances
paid or payable by the government to military personnel for any period of
incapacitation incident to injury to such personnel caused by negligent third
parties; cost of medical treatment, hospitalization, travel, or other expense
or loss to the government, in the rehabilitation of military personnel incident
to injury; cost of funeral, burial, transportation, or other expense or loss to
the government, incident to death of military personnel; expense to the government incurred in other cases, arising from negligence or wrongful act,
where the government's obligation is fixed by common law, federal or state
statute, convention, treaty, or agreement.
Generally speaking, it will be observed that the regulation includes those
elements of damage which could be collected by a private person for damage
to his property and those which could be collected by an employer for injury
to his employee. Claims resulting from personal injuries to civilian personnel
in the War Department are not considered under the regulation. They are
handled under the. United States Employees Compensation Act.9
In asserting claims under the regulation .the government, in recognition
of Erie Railroad vs. Tompkins, supra, concedes, in the absence of federal law,
that the law of the situs determines liability."' The government in applying
the local law makes an important concession. Since in the allowance of claims
against the government it has been firmly established that contributory negligence on the part of the claimant defeats his claims brought under the Domestic
Claims Act, the army, as a matter of policy, refuses to assert any claim in
which the negligence of militarr personnel was a contributing cause to the
damage or injury, even though the jurisdiction is one that applies the doctrine
of last clear chance or comparative negligence.
'This regulation supersedes Army Regulation 25-220, dated 3 July 1943.
9 5 U.S.C. 751-798.
"In a case -wherein certain town ordinances required the giving of notice to the
municipality within thirty days from the date bf damage caused by negligence of agents
of the municipality, it was held that such ordinances were binding on the Government
in a tort asserted by the Government against the municipality. Digest of Opinions of
the Judge Advocate General: Dig. Op. JAG 1912-40, page 910.
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In the event the government institutes suit for damages it does so in the
capacity of any other private litigant and waives any immunity as a sovereign.
The defendant may therefore interpose any defense, including a counterclaim.
In such cases the question of contributory negligence, or any other question,
is for the determination of the court."
Suits or claims by the government are not barred by ordinary statutes
of limitation or by laches, unless the Congress has clearly indicated an intent
that the government be barred by enacting legislation so providing. No such
legislation has been enacted applicable to claims under Army Regulations
25-220.
The laws in the different jurisdictions are fairly uniform as to the elements recoverable for damage to real or personal property. However, with
respect to the provision of the regulation under which the government asserts
a right to recover for loss of services of its military personnel, and for expenses
incident to their injury or death, serious questions may arise. The only direct
authority available on this troublesome question is a case decided in the District Court of the United States, Southern District of California, Central
Division. The case considered by that court was United States vs. Standard
Oil Company of California.12 The question for determination was whether
or not the United States has the right to recover for hospitalization and wages
paid to a soldier during the time he was incapacitated, through the tortious
act of the defendant. The court recognized that there were no precedents controlling, and in holding that the government could recover said:
"At the common law, the master could recover for loss of services resulting from a tort committed on the servant of a third person. By analogy, a
parent was given the right to recover for the loss of the services of his child,
and a husband for those of his wife. And these actions are entirely independent of the right of the servant, child, or wife to recover for the injuries themselves. When a man becomes a soldier, a status is created whether the soldier
enlisted voluntarily or is selected under a Selective Service Law. A voluntary
enlistment originates in a contract for a definite period. But any similarity
between it and other contractual relationships, such as master and servant
ceases. The essence of the relation of master and servant is the freedom of
the servant to end it, subject, of course, to responsibility of wrongful termination. * * * So the upshot of the matter is this: A special relation has been
created. Whether we call it a status, as some of the cases do, or whether we
'ust call it -Covernment and soldier relation, it is clear that both the soldier
and the Government have certain rights and obligations arising from it and
that a third party who, through his tortious act, interferes with it to the detriment of the Government, is responsible for the mischief he causes. And he
Fed. (2d)to 170.
Supp. 135;
Seed Co.,and14 isFed.
vs. Moscow
the Circuit Court.
being92 appealed
at present
ThisS.case
is not reported
"1 U.
It is Case No. 4204-Y Civil, District Court of the United States, Southern District
of California, Central Division.
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cannot avoid responsibility for his act by claiming that the relation is one for
which the common law did not have a name."
The settlement of any claim asserted by the government for injury to
military personnel does not serve to discharge any cause of action existing
in favor of the injured soldier. His right to recover for negligent or wrongful
injury to himself is a separate and distinct right from the right of the government to recover for the loss of his services or the expense incident to his care
and rehabilitation. The converse is likewise true. 13
Claims in behalf of the government are investigated in the same manner
and by the same personnel as those considered in Part I of this article. If it
is determined that the defendant is liable the commanding officer who appointed the claims officer refers the file to his Claims Judge Advocate. If he
concurs in the recommendation the commanding officer will make a written
demand for payment 'unless payment or an acceptable offer of compromise
has already been made. Payments in full are transmitted to the appropriate
fiscal officer.
The commanding officer has no authority to accept an offer of compromise, or to abandon the claim by reason of noncollectability.
If the demand is not met within a reasonable time the file is forwarded
to the commanding general of the service command, who in turn refers it to
his claims judge advocate. This officer will probably renew the demand. If
payment or an offer of compromise is not forthcoming within a reasonable
time the file is forwarded to the Judge Advocate General in Washington.
The commanding general of the service command may abandon the case by
reason of the amount involved or for any other special circumstance. He also
closes the case if the defendant is not liable.
All cases requiring suit, or settlement by reason of an offer of compromise, must be forwarded to the Judge Advocate General. There they are
reviewed and sent to the Secretary of War for transmittal to the Attorney
General. The Attorney General, by virtue of his office, prosecutes the suit
in the event such action is necessary. He, and he alone, has authority to accept
an offer of compromise. Of course, the practical work of the Attorney General is done by the various United States District Attorneys. Acting in behalf
of the Attorney General they have full discretion in prosecuting or dismissing the case, or in effectuating a compromise.
The practical effect of the outlined procedure is that only a small percentage of the potential claims are actually tried. A considerable portion are
compromised in Washington through the cooperation of insurance carriers,
the Judge Advocate General and the Attorney General. Many are abandoned,
particularly when the damage to the government is not substantial. Many
" "The Government is not concerned with any settlement between the soldier and
a third person. . . . Any such settlement would not affect the Government's right to
proceed against the third person for all the hospital costs and pay of the soldier

injured."

Bulletin Judge Advocate General, April 1943, page 155.
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are discontinued because of practical difficulties. Often the necessary witnesses
are military personnel who have been transferred from the scene of the
damage or injury. They are either unobtainable, or the difficulty of returning
them to the jurisdiction where the damage or injury occurred is disproportionate to the amount of the claim.
One source of annoyance to lawyers is the provision in the regulation
which prohibits the giving of a release, even though the amount of the payment is the full amount of the government's claim. The reason for this is
that under federal law the Attorney General is the only one who has authority to compromise or release any defendant, against whom the government
has a claim, from further liability. Therefore, in the event a release is insisted
upon it must be obtained, through military channels, from the Attorney General. This procedure is quite unnecessary in view of the provisions in the
regulation which empowers the claims officer, or any reviewing authority, to
give a receipt reciting that payment in full has been received by the government for the injury or damage specified. This has the same practical effect
as a release.
In conclusion the writer desires to make it clear that this article is not
all inclusive on the subject of government claims. Attention has been directed
only to War Department claims. If a problem arises involving other government agencies an investigation should be made through those agencies to
determine what remedies are provided, and to determine what rights and
obligations have been incurred. Also,' no attempt has been made to consider
contractual claims which arise against the government and which are handled
by the United States Court of Claims.
The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Captain Sherman
C. Wilke of the Judge Advocate Office of the Ninth Service Comand who
very kindly supplied source material and who gave valuable assistance in
editing the material contained herein.

Should We Change Our Legal
Educational System? t
By LEONARD A. WORTHINGTON

*

* Of the San Francisco Bar.

The noteworthy action by the State Bar of California in providing for
the placement, re-establishment, and education of returning lawyer veterans
is worthy of the highest commendation and brings to mind a parallel matter
that requires immediate study and attention by the lawyers and legal educa
tors of this state.
t Reprinted by permission from the Journal of the State Bar of California,
Jaf.,Feb. 1946.
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Recognizing the value of lecture refresher courses and the "case book"
method of instruction adopted by the majority of our leading law schools
nevertheless the strides which have been made in educational systems, particularly army instructional methods, causes one to wonder whether or not our
methods might not well come under the scrutiny of progressively minded
educators for some far reaching improvements.
Consider these factors facing the law schools of tomorrow. Returning
veterans with three or four years service, mature, sober minded, practical
thinking students will make up the major part of our initial law school
classes. Depending on the success or failure of the proposed universal military
training program, the succeeding classes may likewise be composed of veterans
with perhaps slightly less military service.' But in the main they will have
been subjected to army instruction with its emphasis on preparation, explanation, demonstration, application, examination and discussion and returning to
civilian life will carry back with them much of what they have learned about
instructional procedures and methods.
Our present day veterans have "learned to do by doing" after careful
demonstrations and explanations of "how it should be done." They have
actually felt, seen and heard the desired material before attempting to do it
themselves. They have studied their mistakes, discussed them and corrected
them. These carefully planned progressive stages of training have made our
army what it is today. Mistakes, though made often, have been kept to the
minimum that time, circumstances, and lack of experience could control.
When a man's life and that of his buddy depends on his doing the
"right thing at the right time" he cannot afford to make mistakes. His only
right of appeal is marked by a broken body or a hero's grave.
A better fate generally awaits the erring lawyer, for ofttimes the error
is two sided and the right of appeal has been used to cover many an oversight which proper education, experience and preparation might have prevented. The lawyers of today owe it to the lawyers of tomorrow to give them
the very best in educational methods and training that lies within their power
to confer on the future generation. The property, welfare and life of a client
is worthy of the same protection and representation as is given to a soldier
on the field of battle. If any lawyer doubt this statement let him try explaining a costly mistake to his client which has caused him to lose a case
once reported certain of success.
We should examine the attitude of a lawyer veteran or law school
student veteran who has just completed his army education and faces a tour
of duty under the case book system as it is taught today. The slow, painful
and uninteresting reading of cases, digging out the facts, listening to a lecture
without a clear cut picture in advance of where they are going, why they are
reading cases and what practical value it will be to them may cause discouragement and perhaps abandonment of a legal career for many a potentially great
lawyer.
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Accustomed to the army slogan of "keep your objective before you at all
times," "learn the who, when, how, what, where and why of every situation,"
the new student will presumably spend three years of drudgery under the
outmoded "case book system," if it is used as the sole method of instruction.
Comparing educational systems, for example, the army would teach their men
the intricacies of a demurrer by the following method. First, they would explain by lecture or film the purpose, function and place of a demurrer. This
is called the goal or objective, and thereafter they would be admonished to
keep the goal in mind and apply it to the phases of instruction which would
follow. Following the who, what, when, where, how and why rule the form,
procedure and effect of a demurrer would be demonstrated, by lecture,
illustrations, slides or training films. Suitable examples of the function of a
demurrer including its presentation in court would be enacted before the
class. The class would next be called upon to apply what they had learned
and "do it themselves" possibly starting from the preparation of a demurrer
and carrying through to its final argument, showing the result thereof and
having all members of the class participate in the presentation. A practical
or oral examination would be given followed by a general discussion or
critique covering all errors noted in the demonstration. All unanswered
questions would be settled. The study of cases and the "case-book" system
would be only a phase of this course of instruction but not the entire course
in itself.
Each subject could be carefully prepared and presented so that when
a student finished his semester on any course he would see clearly its applicability to his contemplated practice of the law in later years.
Actual demonstration of trials of a law-suit, attendance at a trial, and
class preparation of an entire case from beginning to end should be a part
of a legal education. Every practicing lawyer today recognizes the increased
interest and multiple benefits to be derived from a course of study designed
in this manner.
It would necessitate a great amount of work and research to revise our,
entire educational system for this purpose but the lawyers of California working in conjuction with law school deans and professors would be capable of
this task.
It would present a splended opportunity for the leading lawyers of this
state in their respective fields to form a committee on each subject and meet
with the law school professors in a sincere effort of finding a better way of
helping our future barristers. No better contribution could be made to their
profession than to give of their knowledge and experience to those who will
later in life carry on the ideals and traditions which they have so capably
borne.
If the self-assurance of only one future lawyer or his desire to continue
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in this chosen profession could be brought about by a revised educational
system this above would be well worth the effort. Many a man today ekes
out his living in another business or profession because the uninteresting
drudgery of a law school course, the embarrassment of his first legal defeat
caused by lack of knowledge, or inability to cope with a situation, sent him
away from the legal profession in which he might have risen to great heights.
The lawyers as a whole, and not he should bear the blame, for in their own
quest for personal success perhaps they have failed to take time out to lend a
helping hand to those who looked in vain for guidance and assistance.
A committee of the State Bar of California delving into this subject
might unearth tremendous support behind such a proposed change in our
educational system if the comments of lawyers throughout the state were
solicited. Through public appeal they could secure the gratuitous services of
able lawyers who would be grateful for the opportunity of contributing in
some manner to the welfare of the lawyers of tomorrow and enabling them to
obtain a proper foundation for their future.
Suggestions and recommendations from lawyers relative to this subject
would be welcomed.

Current Trends in Federal Jurisprudence t
By HON.

EDMUND

J.

BRANDON *

The progressive character of federal jurisprudence has recently received
enhancement from two distinct developments in the fields of substantive and
adjective law.
Substantively, a most laudable project has been undertaken by the House
of Representatives Committee on Revision of the Laws in initiating a program
of codification by which each of the present 50 Titles of the United States
Code will be re-enacted as separate entities.
At the present time, the only official text of federal enactments is to
be found in the Statues-at-Large, which are published in bound volumes at
the end of each session of the Congress. These- volumes are generally
available only on the shelves of large law libraries, and are at best rather
cumbersome and unmanageable legal tools. The two other generally available
sources of federal statutes-the four-volume edition of the United States Code
with annual Supplement, published by the Government Printing Office,
and the United States Code Annotated, printed commercially,-are only
prima facie evidence of the law.
t Reprinted by permission from the Bar Bulletin of the Bar Association of the
City of Boston, April, 1946.
* United States Attorney for the District of Massachusetts. The views expressed
herein are those of the writer, and are not to be construed as those of the Department
of Justice.
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In order, therefore, that a more compact edition of the United States
Code may be available to the public and the bar with an official imprimatur,
the house committee has undertaken the task of codifying federal substantive
statutes so that the public and the bar may thereafter rely upon the text in
the code as authoritative.
It is the aim of the house committee to remove from the body of federal
legislation all enactments or portions of enactments which are duplicitous, obsolete, or redundant. Uniformity of phraseology, imposition of penalties consistent
with the relative gracity of offenses, and elimination of incongruities, are
three of the aims of the revisers. The ultimate goal is to re-legislate all of
the permanent and general laws contained in the present code, so as to make
available a basic scheme within and around which all future amendatory enactments may be drafted.
To date, the most ambitious re-codification undertaken is that by which
Title 18 of the United States Code, relating to crimes and criminal procedure,
has been revised and redrafted as a logical, harmonious, and consistent entity.
The re-codified draft of this title is now-pending before the present Congress
in the form of a bill ' which has been favorably reported by the house
committee.
The committee intends to perform a similar operation on each of the 50
Titles contained in the present code, and as the work of re-drafting proceeds,
the bar may anticipate the gradual evolution of a workable, compact code of
federal substantive law.
The second major development is the recent promulgation of a body
of procedural rules to govern criminal practice in the federal courts.
The trend toward procedural uniformity in federal jurisprudence began
with the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.2 The
universal approbation with which they were received, and the success of their
operation served as inducement and encouragement to promulgate a similar
body of procedural canons to govern criminal procedure.
Accordingly,' in 1940, the Congress passed an Act 3 empowering the
Supreme Court to appoint an Advisory Committee to draft a similar set of
rules relative to criminal procedure. The enabling act provided that the
rules, after adoption by the Supreme Court, should be submitted through the
Attorney General to the Congress. The submission was made by the Attorney
General on January 3, 1945, and the rules lay before the entire First Session
of the 79th Congress which adjourned on December 21, 1945. The rules
provided 4 that they would take effect on the day which was three months
subsequent to adjournment of the first regular Session of the 79th Congress,
'H. R. 2200, 79th Cong. 1st Sess. (H. Rept. No. 152).

'The Act of June 19, 1934 (48 Stat. 1064) authorized the Supreme Court to

draft and promulgate the civil rules.

'Act of June 29, 1940 (54 Stat. 688).

'Fed. Rules of Crim. Proc., Rule 59.
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and as a result, they became operative in all judicial districts of the United
States on March 21, 1946.
The new rules constitute a framework of reference to which an attorney
may turn and find in one place the precepts of procedure which govern the
conduct of a criminal trial, and under which the rights of his client are determined. The rules have been drafted so as to achieve clarity, uniformity,
and precision, without, however, endeavoring to provide for regulation of
minute details or to preclude the adoption of subsidiary local rules which are
not inconsistent. None of the traditional safeguards which have become
imbedded in Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence have been abandoned,
and such innovations as have been introduced are consonant with the fundamental principles of fairness and justice.
The rules serve as a guide to the lawyer throughout a federal criminal
trial from complaint through verdict. With their adoption, the task of subjecting the entire field of federal procedure to regulation by judicial rulemaking has been completed. This means that the practicing attorney may
now proceed with certainty and confidence in both the civil and criminal
sides of the federal courts. Pamphlet copies of the rules and the Advisory
Committee annotations thereto are available from the Government Printing
Office at Washington at nominal cost, and they should certainly be made a
part of the lbirary of every practioner.
in connection with the general subject of federal jurisprudence, it may
be well to refer to the Federal Register Act of 1935. 5 Experience has shown
that only a small portion of the membership of the bar is aware of this legistion and its importance as a landmark in the field of federal administrative law.
The Federal Register Act provides for the establishment of a division of
the Federal Register in the National Archives. This division is charged
with the duty fo publishing in the federal register (published daily) all presidential proclamations, executive orders, and administrative directives and
regulations of general applicability having the force of law which are promulgated by the various executive and quasi-judicial federal agencies. All permanent sub-legislation of this character must be published in the Federal Register
and thereafter incorporated into the Code of Federal Regulations. This code,
together with the register, constitutes the official and primary source of reference for information concerning the rules, regulations, and procedural requirements which interpret, implement, and apply the provisions of federal
regulatory statutes.
The importance of this body of federal sub-legislation is strikingly
illustrated by the fact that the statutes contained in four volumes and one
supplement of the United States Code require approximately 45 volumes of
the Code of Federal Regulations in order to contain the orders and directives
issued pursuant thereto.
'Act of July 26, 1935 (49 Stat. 500; 44 U. S. C. 301 et seq.)
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It will be conceded, I think, that the vast majority of the legal relations
between the citizen and the general government are now primarily administrative in character. Consequently, it is transcendently important that the
members of the legal profession familiarize themselves with this vast
body of executive and quasi-judicial law, in order that they may ascertain
not only its nature and character, but the procedure. by which it may be
effectively applied in order to enable them more competently to advise and
assist their clients.

Letter to the Editor
Editor:
May this organization take this means of calling your attention to the
very urgent necessity of re-organizing our city courts. You are doubtless
aware of the unsatisfactory condition of our justice courts--judges with
grossly inadequate pay, one court over-loaded with an undue proportion of
the business--numerous delays and continuances, litigants and witnesses compelled to waste hours upon hours in waiting, lawyers unwilling to handle
cases in inferior courts without fees greatly disproportionate to the amounts
involved, an impractical and unused small-claims statute, a system which
by reason of its burdens operates to deny remedy to thousands of meritorious claims, and leave the public with the definite impression that if the
litigant wins he loses.
Los Angeles has a wonderfully successful small claims court-lawyers
are not permitted to appear therein, any citizen may have his small claim
adjudicated by filing an affidavit, paying a docket fee of $1.00, obtaining
service by registered mail, escaping continuances and delays, having his
case heard summarily (usually by way of conciliation). One of the best
services that could be provided for the people of Denver would be a small
claims court similar to the one in Los Angeles.
Worthy of consideration is a suggestion that Denver should have a
municipal court, with about four judges, embracing justice court jurisdiction,
two police courts (one a night session) and one handling exclusively small
claims limited to $50. No added expense would fall upon tax-payers-such
courts are self-supporting.
We hope you will take an active interest in the proposed re-organization of our lower courts. It will be necessary to enlist the interest of lawyers, business men and property owners, and particularly the Mayor, the
City Attroney, the Council, Chambers of Commerce and service clubs.
Thanking you and anticipating your cooperation, we are
Very truly yours,
DENVER HOTEL AND APARTMENT OWNERS' ASSN.
By PATRICK M. WALKER, President.
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